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This article offers a systematic and pragmatic approach to Eurasian inte-
gration. It assumes that integration is not an objective, but an essential
means to resolve the pressing problems of all countries involved, with
economic modernization as the key challenge.
Pragmatic Eurasianism is aimed at securing “integration from
below,” meaning that free movement of goods, services, labor, and cap-
ital is a guarantee of long-term stability and is crucial for the success of
integration. It is an ideology of open regionalism that does not shrink
into itself, but which is based on consolidation across the continent,
both towards the West and the East.
Pragmatism in politics does not mean it cannot be fleshed out with a
value dimension. Eurasianism is an ideology. It needs substance and a
technocratic approach to the political and management processes. It
gives priority to the economy and is a prudent approach to estimating
the balance between long-term benefits and losses.
N O T  A N  E N D  I N  I T S E L F
Integration can have both positive and negative economic results. For
example, specialists know that integration can “launch trade” or “scale
down trade or welfare.” Trade often declines in a newly established free
trade zone or a customs union when consumption shifts from an exter-
nal producer with low production costs to the domestic producer, with
higher production costs. Consequently, the benefits shrink. In this case,
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the calculations are complicated and should take into account the
impact of this shift on employment, the long-term goals of industrial
policy, security issues, etc. Integration may not necessarily have positive
effects a priori. The entire process should be thoroughly calculated.
Integration is a tool to achieve objectives. For CIS and Common
European Space economies (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), modern-
ization is the objective. This goal implies a more advantageous place in the
international division of labor, less dependence on oil and gas, and
increasing industrial strength based on cooperation. Indeed, cooperation
in science, technology, and education serve this purpose. In the social
sphere, the key objective of integration is to reach lasting international and
inter-religious peace, and secure a comfortable environment in order to
maintain family ties between citizens of the countries involved.
The current oil price of $110 per barrel for Brent crude is abnormal-
ly high and prices will not stay at this level forever. Thus, it would be irre-
sponsible, at the very least, to build a long-term economic policy based
on the hope that prices will remain favorable. Economic planning
should allow for a possible decline in oil prices over an extended period.
The post-Soviet economies can be divided into three groups: (1) fuel
suppliers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan); (2) the
relatively small economies of Armenia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajik-
istan that are the major suppliers of labor resources; (3) and Belarus,
Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, countries noted for a considerable share of
exports with a high level of processing.
The economic crisis will impact all of the Eurasian integration coun-
tries without exception. Oil exporters – Russia and Kazakhstan – will be
the first to suffer and experience a decline in export revenue. Additional-
ly, Russia and Kazakhstan will encounter problems in foreign investment,
which is vital for the banking system and the manufacturing sector. Work-
force exporter countries will see a drop in revenue from labor migrants
working in Russia and Kazakhstan, while countries in the third group will
be affected by plunging external demand and high prices for foreign loans.
Falling oil prices could destabilize the leading countries of the
region; at best, those countries will not feel like engaging in any integra-
tion projects. Will protectionism prevail during the crisis and can it be
truncated within the scope of the Customs Union? Will the Customs
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Union member-states be able to maintain the attained integration level
without resorting to transfers between well-to-do countries and their less
successful partners? With plunging export revenue and economic activi-
ty, there will not be enough funds for foreign aid. On top of that, such
transfers would be extremely unpopular politically.
In case of Eurasian integration, the challenging question is: Will
integration remain strong with oil prices at $80 per barrel for an extend-
ed time, at $60 or even $40?
One thing is clear: the stability of this integration project can be secured
in the long term only through real and successful integration “from below”
– with the help of mutually advantageous flows of goods, services, labor,
and capital. Transnational companies and holdings with interdependent
assets in countries of the future Eurasian Union could become a crucial
factor for stability. It is true that such projects are often problematic (con-
sider the repeated Franco-German rows in EADS), yet they form the
backbone of economic integration, which can survive a crisis. 
A prerequisite of economic growth is not to launch new technologies
as such, but technological leadership, at least in certain areas. If a coun-
try cannot find such a niche, it will be slow to learn new technologies
and have to be content with a smaller volume of added value. Pooling
markets, resources, and assets has two advantages. First, a more capa-
cious domestic market creates favorable conditions for saving on a larg-
er scale. Second, close ties within the framework of technological chains
provide necessary stability and additional resources.
The objective needs of CES countries’ economic development
require an enhanced role of the industrial sector in their economies.
They are facing the task of reviving industry as an economic driver. Con-
sequently, the CES’s economic policy should take into account the
needs of its member-states and their export potential. This entails mov-
ing away from traditional industrial policy based on indicative planning,
while developing incentives, maintaining competition, and ensuring
attractive rules of the game for businesses.
For the first time in the past two decades, a favorable environment is
taking shape for formulating an integral coordinated program for the
long-term economic development of CES states and increasing the
global competitiveness of their national economies, and of the CES in
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general. This program should envision a tight bond – a uniform trading
policy for CES states, coordination of their industrial policies, and coor-
dination of their science and technology policies.
T R A N S N A T I O N A L  C O M P A N I E S  A N D  H O L D I N G S
Mutual investment in general and transnational holdings and companies
in particular can serve as one of the key factors of stability and success of
Eurasian integration.
It is expedient to stimulate cooperation and the process of mergers and
acquisitions with the consolidated entry of CES producers into the world
market. Transnational companies or holdings should be set up in areas
where their member-states have real opportunities to become world lead-
ers, and where the consolidated potential of several countries is expected
to contribute to cooperation. As a rule, transnational companies are estab-
lished in technologically advanced sectors of the economy. Consequently,
creating transnational companies becomes an instrument of technological
rapprochement and modernization. In certain cases, where it is econom-
ically justified, broken technological links are restored.
It makes sense to set up transnational companies in those sectors
where they already have comparative and/or competitive advantages, or
a considerable potential for such. There are about 10 to 12 sectors or
breakthrough points outside of the oil and gas sector in the post-Soviet
space. These areas include ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the coke
industry, fertilizer production, power machine building, railway engi-
neering, heavy truck manufacturing, aircraft and helicopter manufac-
turing, and the aerospace and agriculture sectors (especially grain pro-
duction). The making of “Eurasian leaders” requires support in the
breakthrough sectors where the global market does not allow the emer-
gence of such leaders without the state’s involvement.
Transnational companies should have ambitious tasks. For example,
the Russian-Ukrainian helicopter holding is planning to undergo exten-
sive modernization, find new market niches, and boost its share in the
world market from 17 percent to 30 percent by 2030. The Kazakh-Rus-
sian nuclear energy holding is looking for a foothold in all stages of the
nuclear fuel cycle. The company wants to overtake Areva, Cameco, and
Toshiba to become the number one nuclear energy supplier to the world
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market by 2030. A federal support program has been created with the
view of meeting ambitious targets, and it includes market protection
measures, recapitalization, funding, and financing R&D and profes-
sional education, which is probably the most crucial investment. 
T H E  S U B S I D I A R I T Y  P R I N C I P L E
The subsidiarity principle underlying U.S. federalism and European
unification can apply to Eurasian integration as well. In simple terms,
the principle can be formulated thus: “If there is no drastic need to do
something at the supranational level, do not do it.”
Under this principle, problems are solved at the lowest possible level
where their solution is feasible and effective. Authority and financial
resources are shared in the same manner, while political decisions are
made at a level that is as close to the population as possible.
Under the subsidiarity principle, the problems addressed at the
supranational level are those whose solution is either necessary at that
level (such as uniform foreign trade policy and technical regulation
within the common market) or more effective and advantageous. There-
fore, the implementation of the subsidiarity principle becomes part of
the general pragmatic approach to integration.
T H E  S I G N I F I C A N C E  
O F  S O C I O - C U LT U R A L  I N T E G R A T I O N
The long-term significance of the socio-cultural aspects of integration is
on par with economic achievements at the very least. These include fam-
ily ties, permanent and temporary migration, educational links, tourism,
cultural exchange, etc. Integration strengthens ethnic and religious peace
not only in international relations, but also in the countries involved.
The effect of social integration is largely immaterial and defies cal-
culation, yet its significance is difficult to overestimate. For example,
residents of the Omsk and Akmola regions would care more about the
recent launch of the Astana-Omsk air link than robust trade statistics. A
trip between these two cities, which took eleven hours by train, can now
be made in just over an hour. Such innovations facilitate trade and
investment interaction, communication between relatives, tourism, and
educational exchange.
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The Russian language plays a tremendous consolidating role. Measures to
preserve it as a means of international communication are highly prof-
itable. The network of Pushkin institutes is a good investment in the future.
The key education goals in long-term integration include: cultural and
educational exchanges of grade school students, university students, post-
graduates, and teachers; the harmonization of education programs; and
mutual recognition of teaching certificates. An educational exchange pro-
gram comparable to Europe’s Erasmus Mundus program could be named
after Shoqan Walikhanov, a Kazakh scholar and historian who was educat-
ed in Omsk. A system of grants could cover, either fully or partially, expens-
es to study abroad for one or two terms. It is essential that the widespread
program involve thousands of students every year.
O P E N  R E G I O N A L I S M
Pragmatic Eurasianism should take into account both the expenses and
benefits of integration so that the elements on both sides of the debate
are understood in a broader context. An extended project timeframe
allows for a number of other effects, not necessarily economic. But does
this mean that Eurasian integration is a purely “bookkeeping” process?
No, it does not. Even if the discussion of the future of Eurasian integra-
tion is deliberately held in a pragmatic and technocratic light, the ideo-
logical aspect remains. Indeed, Eurasianism is an ideology. The question
is what kind of ideology. 
At the very least Eurasianism is often viewed as an alternative to the
European orientation of Russia and former Soviet republics and as a
synonym for the “special path of Russia.” The idea of Eurasianism
appeared in the 1920s, although its origins are in the search by 19th-cen-
tury Russian intellectuals for self-identification. The Eurasian ideology
had a difficult path, as it emerged within the community of Russian emi-
grants who were detached from their once great, but now devastated,
homeland. Today the establishment of Eurasianism is complicated by a
real and far-fetched nostalgia for the Soviet past.
The terms ‘Eurasia’ and ‘Eurasianism’ are quite popular today in
Russia, Kazakhstan, and other countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. ‘Eurasia’ is usually used as a synonym for the post-Sovi-
et space. In Russia, Eurasianism is often treated as an anti-Western ide-
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ology that underlines the exclusiveness of a “special way for Russia,”
whereas in Kazakhstan it is never used in that sense. There are some
alternatives to these approaches. Eurasia can be regarded as a space for
interaction between a broad range of countries in Europe and Asia. Rus-
sia, Kazakhstan, and the CIS in general would benefit most from the
continental format of integration.
It would be useful to make a distinction between two Eurasian inte-
grations: the processes of unifying post-Soviet space that have become
increasingly intensive in recent years, and the processes of rapproche-
ment across the continent that have become a reality in the past decades.
We understand continental Eurasian integration as a quality growth of
economic, political, and social ties between regions of the Eurasian
supercontinent – Europe, Central and Northern Eurasia, and East,
South, and West Asia.
There are several key aspects to forming a productive Eurasian ideology. 
First, post-Soviet Eurasian integration should focus on the economy.
The collaboration between the Customs Union (a common customs
space) and the Common Economic Space (dozens of agreements to
establish uniform rules in the economy; in effect, it is a Eurasian com-
mon market) establishes a solid groundwork for integration. This focus
will help strengthen the technocratic element and dedicate integration
instruments to resolving the main task – economic modernization and
increased global competitiveness. A package of socio-cultural issues is
an integral addition to economic integration. At the same time, a con-
servative approach based on the subsidiarity principle is expedient in
developing the political aspects of integration.
Second, Russia should not be the only locomotive of integration. That
Eurasia is not a synonym of Russia is a crucial point. Despite Russia’s obvi-
ous domination as the largest regional economy, the Eurasian project, at
least its political dimension, cannot be Russia-centric. It needs other active
players, and keeping Kazakhstan’s important role in it is crucial.
Third, Eurasian integration should not shrink into itself or try to
restore the unity of post-Soviet countries in one form or another.
Unquestionably, the potential of economic and technological rap-
prochement in the post-Soviet world is considerable, but not endless.
Continental Eurasian integration would be a natural further step.
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Deeper economic integration to the west (the European Union), to the east
(China, South Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia), and, to a lesser extent, to the
south (India, Turkey) promise many benefits. Such prospects include:
establishing common trade regulations; harmonizing technical standards;
building infrastructure for the export of hydrocarbons; creating railway and
motor transport transit; industrializing transit; improving ground telecom-
munications; expanding regional and sub-regional electricity markets; bet-
tering cooperation in border areas; establishing visa-free travel between
certain countries; promoting student exchanges, etc. 
These principles are aimed at establishing open regionalism in Eura-
sia, where post-Soviet states will serve as the driver, the supporting ele-
ment, and the main beneficiaries. This paradigm allows for a new out-
look at key issues of integration, such as the role of Ukraine.
T H E  U K R A I N I A N  I S S U E
Almost no other issue is as politicized and formalized as Ukraine’s
choice of civilization. Regrettably, this discussion largely runs along the
“either – or” principle, while in continental integration the “and –
and” approach is more likely. 
There is profound misunderstanding in the post-Soviet space and the
European Union of the essence of integration projects. Europe and the
West in general have viewed the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and, recently, the Common Economic Space, as products of “Russian
imperialism.” Europeans find it difficult to comprehend just how deeply
rooted cooperation ties inherited from the Soviet past really are, and
how vital their role is for the economic modernization of Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The world has seen no precedents
for such disintegration (except for, perhaps, the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire), although a breakup of this kind is not difficult to
picture. Just imagine a collapse of the European Union (not only of the
euro zone, but the entire common market). Consider all the incentives
for European reintegration in this situation and multiply the result by
three; the Soviet economy was much more integrated than the economy
of the current European Union.
The laws of competition should not be ignored either. In the CIS,
production cooperation is expected to secure entry into export markets.
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Who said that global rivals want to see an industrial breakthrough of
Eurasian partners?
Importantly, European and post-Soviet integration should not be
viewed as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, CIS regionalism might
become a step towards integration with the European Union. The Cus-
toms Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia could be a more effec-
tive and stronger partner for the EU than individual countries. It could
also provide additional stimuli to launch dialogue over common infras-
tructure and adapt European norms and standards.
At present, Ukraine, sandwiched between the EU and the Customs
Union, is being torn apart by heated debates about the possibility that
the country will join this or that community. But let us consider: Does
Ukraine’s “European choice” rule out its integration with Russia and its
partners? After all, Russia’s European choice and its desire for econom-
ic, political, and cultural rapprochement with Europe are obvious. 
Kazakhstan is a “European” country too. The European Union is
Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and, according to the IMF, the EU
accounted for 37.7 percent of Kazakh exports and 32.3 percent of foreign
trade in 2010. Kazakh companies place securities on the London
Exchange and Kazakh students study in Europe under the Bolashak gov-
ernment-sponsored scholarship program. Some 50 percent of Bolashak-
ers studied in Europe (compared to five percent in East and Southeast
Asia; 28 percent in the United States; and nine percent in Russia).
The economic integration of the European Union and Customs
Union may provide an optimal long-term solution to the “Ukrainian
issue.” Granting Customs Union membership to Ukraine would be a
strong move, with the subsequent signing of a free trade agreement
between the post-Soviet trading bloc (embracing a population of some 220
million and a GDP of around $2.2 trillion) and the European Union.
Under this scenario, Ukraine would achieve all of its goals and secure
good relations with Russia and other partners in North and Central Eura-
sia, while strengthening its European choice at the same time. Such an
agreement would become a universal groundwork to harmonize legislation
and eventually launch visa-free travel. Another option is to sign agree-
ments on comprehensive free trade within the EU-Ukraine-Customs
Union triangle. These accords should certainly include not only trade
Pragmatic Eurasianism
RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 11 • No. 2 • APRIL – JUNE • 2013 95
2013_eng#2.qxd  26.06.2013  07:38  Page 95
issues, but also free movement of people and capital, the gradual unifica-
tion of technical standards, and infrastructure integration.
An optimal solution to engaging Ukraine in a “large Eurasia” is only
possible through the involvement of the European Union and Customs
Union. In principle, the EU does not reject the possibility of interaction
with economic blocs; in 2010 it resumed free trade talks with
MERCOSUR. The very modest results of the EU’s Eastern Partnership
policy should also be taken into account. 
A  E U R A S I A N  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M :
F L E X I B I L I T Y  A N D  V A R I E T Y  
Eurasia is not the same as the post-Soviet space and its borders cannot
be regarded as firmly fixed by the Soviet past. Whereas post-Soviet space
can indeed be the best region for integration in certain sectors, other
options might envision a different combination of countries.
The new reality requires new instruments of productive cooperation
with partner countries both inside the CIS and on the Eurasian conti-
nent. For multi-party cooperation, it is possible to set up a program for
CES and a future Eurasian Economic Union that might be called
“Eurasian Partnership.” Both bilateral and multi-party partnerships
would be possible within the framework of this organization. However,
emphasis should be placed on bilateral accords that take into account the
specifics of a particular partner. Cooperation can be arranged not only
through agreements, but also through joint action plans (as in the Euro-
pean neighborhood policy) and through participation in joint programs.
The purpose of the Eurasian Partnership program is to ensure concen-
trated trade and economic interaction between the countries of North and
Central Eurasia, and, in future, with other strategic Eurasian partners
without the mandatory prospect of CES membership. A format similar to
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership could be used, where it is possible to
interact with a partner country both in moving towards CES membership
or towards the closest possible cooperation. “Eurasian cooperation” could
become a solid framework for interaction between various countries and
the CES that would promote the interests of all parties.
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